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Abstract
We investigate the interaction of product quality differentiation and consumer
preference heterogeneity in durable goods markets, focusing on the effects of sec-
ondary market liquidity and consumer heterogeneity on equilibrium prices. We
build an infinite-horizon dynamic model of the apartments housing market that
captures the above features. Some apartments are considered lucky, and some
consumers are superstitious. Lucky apartments are valued more highly than
non-lucky ones only by superstitious consumers. Results show that the difference
between the lucky apartment price and the non-lucky apartment price becomes
smaller when the secondary market becomes less liquid and when consumers’
preference heterogeneity becomes more persistent as opposed to time-varying.
∗Chen: University of California, Irvine, jiaweic@uci.edu. Shum: Caltech, mshum@caltech.edu.
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In many durable goods markets, products are differentiated in terms of their quality, and
furthermore, consumers are heterogeneous in terms of the value they place on product
quality. An example is the housing market in some Asian communities with a superstitious
culture. In those markets, some apartments are considered lucky because their address
numbers contain the so-called “lucky numbers” (see, for example, Shum, Sun & Ye (2014)).
Among the consumers, some are superstitious and value lucky apartments more highly
than non-lucky ones, while the others are non-superstitious and value lucky and non-lucky
apartments equally.
Another example is the car market, in which new cars have a higher quality than used cars,
but consumers differ in how they value a car’s attribute of being new.1 Some consumers are
“new car lovers” whose valuation of a new car is much higher than that of a used car, while
some other consumers are “used car lovers” whose valuation does not differ significantly
between new and used cars.
In this article, we report the progress in an on-going project in which we investigate the
interaction of the product differentiation and consumer heterogeneity described above. One
focus is the effects of secondary market liquidity and consumers’ preference shocks on the
equilibrium prices.
In particular, we want to understand how the equilibrium prices change (1) when the sec-
ondary market becomes less liquid as transaction cost in the secondary market is heightened,
and (2) when consumer heterogeneity becomes more persistent as the magnitude of their
per-period random preference shocks is reduced.
I Model
To investigate the above issues, we build a model of a durable goods market with product
quality differentiation and consumer preference heterogeneity, using the apartments housing
1See Chen, Esteban & Shum (2013).
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market as an example. Time is discrete. Consumers are infinitely-lived and forward-looking,
and they incur transaction costs when selling the apartment that they own.
There are three goods indexed by j = 0, 1, 2, respectively, where j = 1 indicates a lucky
apartment, j = 2 indicates a non-lucky apartment, and j = 0 indicates the outside good.
There are two types of consumers indexed by l = 1, 2, respectively, where l = 1 indicates a
superstitious consumer and l = 2 indicates a non-superstitious consumer.
For a non-superstitious consumer, the two types of apartments offer the same utility, whereas
for a superstitious consumer, a lucky apartment offers a higher utility than a non-lucky
apartment. Let αlj denote the per-period utility of good j for a type l consumer. Further-
more, let α1 ≡ α11 denote the utility that a superstitious consumer obtains from owning
a lucky apartment, and let α2 ≡ α21 = α12 = α22 denote the utility when the consumer is
non-superstitious and/or when the apartment is non-lucky, with α1 > α2. The outside
good’s utility α0 ≡ α10 = α20 is normalized to 0.
A Consumers’ problem
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived consumers with measure 1. Consumers are dif-
ferentiated in two dimensions. First, consumers differ with respect to superstition. A
measure λ ∈ [0, 1] of consumers are superstitious (l = 1), and the remaining 1 − λ are
non-superstitious (l = 2). A consumer’s superstition is unchanging across time periods and
represents a persistent component of preference heterogeneity across consumers.
Second, consumers also experience preference shocks that vary period-by-period. Let ~it ≡
(ijt, j = 0, 1, 2) be the vector of preference shocks of consumer i in period t. These
preference shocks represent time-varying horizontal differentiation among consumers. We
assume these preference shocks are distributed type I extreme-value, i.i.d. across (i, j, t).
The apartments are infinitely-lived and do not depreciate, and there is no new supply. The
stocks of lucky and non-lucky apartments are therefore constant across time periods. Let θ1
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and θ2 denote the stocks of lucky and non-lucky apartments, respectively, with θ1 + θ2 ≤ 1.
The apartments are fully utilized, i.e., no apartments are unoccupied in any period.
Each consumer owns a single good in each period. Let sit ∈ {0, 1, 2} denote the good
owned by consumer i at the start of period t, and let Bljt denote the measure of type l
consumers who own good j at the start of period t. Accordingly, the matrix Bt ≡ (Bljt, j =
0, 1, 2 and l = 1, 2) summarizes apartment holdings by consumer types at the start of period
t.
The two-element vector ~Bt ≡ (B11t, B22t) consists of the stock of lucky apartments owned by
superstitious consumers and the stock of non-lucky apartments owned by non-superstitious
consumers. We can capture the industry state using ~Bt, as the rest of the elements in Bt
are pinned down once we know B11t and B
2
2t:
B21t = θ1 −B11t,
B12t = θ2 −B22t,
B10t = λ−B11t −B12t = λ−B11t − (θ2 −B22t),
B20t = (1− λ)−B21t −B22t = (1− λ)− (θ1 −B11t)−B22t.
(1)
The industry state space is then Ω ≡ {(B11t, B22t)|0 ≤ B11t ≤ min{λ, θ1}, 0 ≤ B22t ≤ min{1−
λ, θ2}, θ2− λ ≤ B22t−B11t ≤ (1− λ)− θ1}. The restrictions on B11t and B22t are given by the
requirement that all elements in Bt are non-negative.
Let pjt be the price of good j in period t and let ~pt = (p0t, p1t, p2t) be the price vector.
p0t = 0 for all t. Let kj denote the transaction cost incurred when selling good j, with
k1 = k2 = k and k0 = 0, i.e., the transaction cost k is incurred if and only if the consumer
sells an apartment.
Consumer i derives the following utility in period t. If she keeps her current good, sit,
she derives utility αlisit + isitt. If she sells her current good and purchases good j instead,
j 6= sit, her utility is αlij + psitt − pjt − ksit + ijt.
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We can compactly express consumer i’s utility flow in period t as
u(ait, ~pt, sit,~it; li) = α
li
ait + 1ait 6=sit · (psitt − paitt − ksit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ u˜(ait, ~pt, sit; li)
+iaitt,
where ait ∈ {0, 1, 2} denotes i’s consumption choice in t.
We now consider the dynamic optimization problem of each consumer i given (~pt, ~Bt, sit,~it),
the variables that affect the consumer’s choice. Let P (·) denote the price function which
maps from the industry state to the prices, i.e., ~pt = P ( ~Bt), and let L(·) denote the law of
motion of the industry state, i.e., ~Bt+1 = L( ~Bt). Consumers observe the state and prices
in the current period and form expectations of the state and prices in the next period, and
in equilibrium those expectations are correct.
The Bellman equation for consumer i’s dynamic decision problem is then
V (~pt, ~Bt, sit,~it; li) = max
ait
[
u(ait, ~pt, sit,~it; li) + βV˜
(
P (L( ~Bt)), L( ~Bt), ait; li
)]
, (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is consumers’ discount factor, and
V˜ (~pt, ~Bt, sit; li) ≡ E~V (~pt, ~Bt, sit,~it; li)
= log
 ∑
h=0,1,2
exp
(
u˜(h, ~pt, sit; li) + βV˜
(
P (L( ~Bt)), L( ~Bt), h; li
)) (3)
is the expected value function before consumer i’s shock is observed, with the latter substi-
tution following from the assumption that the ’s are distributed type I extreme-value.
Accordingly, the choice probability of good j by a consumer who currently owns good s and
who is of type l takes the multinomial logit form
qj(~pt, ~Bt, s; l) =
exp
(
u˜(j, ~pt, s; l) + βV˜
(
P (L( ~Bt)), L( ~Bt), j; l
))
∑
h=0,1,2 exp
(
u˜(h, ~pt, s; l) + βV˜
(
P (L( ~Bt)), L( ~Bt), h; l
)) . (4)
B Aggregate demand functions
We next aggregate up the choices of all consumers to obtain the aggregate demand function
for each type of apartments in period t.
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Let QDjt denote the quantity demanded of type j apartments in period t and let Q
Dl
jt denote
the quantity demanded of type j apartments by type l consumers in period t. The aggregate
demand functions are then
QDjt =
∑
l=1,2
QDljt =
∑
l=1,2
 ∑
h=0,1,2
(
Blht · qj(~pt, ~Bt, h, ; l)
) . (5)
C Equilibrium and steady state
The equilibrium price function P (·), the equilibrium law of motion L(·), and consumers’
equilibrium expected value function V˜ (·) satisfy the following conditions for every state ~Bt:
(i) Market clearance: At the equilibrium prices P ( ~Bt), quantity demanded equals quantity
supplied for each type of apartments, i.e., QDjt = θj for j = 1, 2.
(ii) Consistency of the law of motion: The industry state evolves according to (B11,t+1, B
2
2,t+1) =
L
(
(B11t, B
2
2t)
)
= (QD11t , Q
D2
2t ), i.e., the next-period apartment holdings based on the equilib-
rium law of motion L(·) equal the relevant quantities demanded in the current period.
(iii) Consistency of consumers’ expected value function: Consumers’ equilibrium expected
value function V˜ (·) satisfies the recursive equation (3).
We compute the equilibrium in the model by solving a system of equations consisting of
the above conditions. Given the equilibrium law of motion L(·), the steady state of the
model (B1ss1t , B
2ss
2t ) satisfies the condition L
(
(B1ss1t , B
2ss
2t )
)
= (B1ss1t , B
2ss
2t ), which allows us
to compute the steady state of the model. The results we report below are steady state
results.
II Preliminary results and next steps
In our baseline specification, we consider the following parameter values. We set α1 = 2 and
α2 = 1.6, so that for superstitious consumers, a lucky apartment offers 25% higher utility
than a non-lucky apartment. We set λ = 0.1, so that 10% of the consumer population is
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superstitious. We set θ1 = 0.2 and θ2 = 0.6, so that 80% (= (0.2 + 0.6)/1) of the consumers
own apartments, and one quarter of the apartments are lucky apartments.
We then examine how the prices change as we vary the transaction cost k and the variance of
consumers’ preference shocks V ar(). Table 1 reports the ratio p2/p1 for all combinations
of the following k and V ar() values: k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and V ar() ∈ {pi2/6, (7/8) ×
pi2/6, (6/8)× pi2/6, (5/8)× pi2/6, (4/8)× pi2/6}.2
We find that as k is increased so that the secondary market becomes less liquid, the difference
between the lucky apartment price (p1) and the non-lucky apartment price (p2) becomes
smaller, i.e., p2/p1 becomes closer to 1. For example, with V ar() = pi
2/6, an increase of k
from 0 to 4 results in the price ratio increasing from 30.5% to 90.7%.
The price difference also becomes smaller as V ar() is decreased so that consumers’ pref-
erence heterogeneity becomes more persistent. For example, with k = 0, a reduction of
V ar() from pi2/6 to (4/8)×pi2/6 results in the price ratio increasing from 30.5% to 50.0%.
In the table, the price ratio is the highest at 96.5% when k is the highest at k = 4 and
V ar() is the lowest at V ar() = (4/8)× pi2/6.
The intuition for the above results is as follows. First, when k is increased so that the
secondary market becomes less liquid and shrinks in size, the price premium for lucky
apartments due to the resale motive—which relies on trading in the secondary market—
diminishes, resulting in a smaller difference between the prices of the two types of apart-
ments.
Second, when V ar() is decreased so that consumers’ preference heterogeneity becomes more
persistent as opposed to time-varying, in the steady state a larger proportion of superstitious
consumers will already own lucky apartments, given that there are more lucky apartments
than superstitious consumers. Consequently, the lucky apartments traded in the market will
increasingly be sold to non-superstitious consumers, who value the two types of apartments
equally. As a result, the difference between the prices of lucky and non-lucky apartments
2When the scale parameter of the type I extreme value distribution for  is normalized to 1, V ar() = pi2/6.
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decreases.
In ongoing research, we are exploring different specifications of the model (including alter-
native distributional assumptions on ) as well as calibration and estimation of the model
using real-world data, in order to better understand the interesting dynamics resulting from
the interaction of product quality differentiation and consumer preference heterogeneity in
durable goods industries.
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0 1 2 3 4
Var(ε)  = π2/6 30.5% 55.8% 75.4% 85.5% 90.7%
Var(ε)  = (7/8)*π2/6 34.8% 60.7% 78.7% 87.6% 92.0%
Var(ε)  = (6/8)*π2/6 39.4% 65.6% 81.9% 89.6% 93.5%
Var(ε)  = (5/8)*π2/6 44.5% 70.7% 85.1% 91.5% 95.1%
Var(ε)  = (4/8)*π2/6 50.0% 76.0% 88.3% 93.7% 96.5%
Table 1. Ratio of p2/p1 for different combinations of k  and Var(ε)
α 1 = 2, α 2 = 1.6, λ  = 0.1, θ 1 = 0.2, θ 2 = 0.6
Transaction cost k
